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Abstract
We describe here a structured system for distributed mechanism design appro-
priate for both Intranet and Internet applications. In our approach the players
dynamically form a network in which they know neither their neighbours nor the
size of the network and interact to jointly take decisions. The only assumption con-
cerning the underlying communication layer is that for each pair of processes there
is a path of neighbours connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary
network topologies.
We also discuss the implementation of this system which consists of a sequence
of layers. The lower layers deal with the operations that implement the basic prim-
itives of distributed computing, namely low level communication and distributed
termination, while the upper layers use these primitives to implement high level
communication among players, including broadcasting and multicasting, and dis-
tributed decision making. This yields a highly flexible distributed system whose
specific applications are realized as instances of its top layer. This design is imple-
mented in Java.
The system supports at various levels fault-tolerance and includes a provision
for distributed policing the purpose of which is to exclude ‘dishonest’ players. Also,
it can be used for repeated creation of dynamically formed networks of players inter-
ested in a joint decision making implemented by means of a tax-based mechanism.
We illustrate its flexibility by discussing a number of implemented examples.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Mechanism design is one of the important areas of economics. To quote from [20], it
deals with the problem of ‘how to arrange our economic interactions so that, when ev-
eryone behaves in a self-interested manner, the result is something we all like.’ So these
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interactions are supposed to yield desired social decisions when each agent is interested
in maximizing only his own utility.
The traditional approaches rely on the existence of a central authority who collects
the information from the players, computes the decision and informs the players about
the outcome and their taxes. The increasing reliance on decision making carried out
through Internet leads to a natural need for distributed solutions that do not rely on any
central authority. But how to translate such real-world considerations into design and
implementation that can be used in practice?
This question was recently addressed in a series of papers on distributed mechanism
design. In this setting no central authority exists and the decisions are taken by the
players themselves, so they need to communicate with each other to take jointly the
desired decision and to compute the taxes. The challenge is to appropriately combine
the techniques of distributed computing with those that deal with the matters specific
to mechanism design, notably rationality (i.e., appropriately defined self-interest) and
truth-telling (i.e., incentive compatibility).
However, to properly implement decision making in the context of the Internet one
needs to address other issues, as well. First of all, one should provide an open system
that can deal with the initially unknown number of interested users. Second, one should
support connectivity between the users who can dynamically join the system. Further,
one should be able to cope with unreliable (hacked or faulty software or hardware in) user
devices that can lead to system failures. Also, it is desirable to provide ways of dealing with
the dishonest users, such as their identification and possible exclusion. These additional
issues have been hardly considered in the papers of distributed mechanism design. In
this paper we discuss a system for distributed mechanism design that addresses all these
issues and that can be readily used both in the Intranet and the Internet setting.
To our knowledge, no working implementation of a distributed mechanism design has
been described in the literature. The gap between published distributed mechanism de-
signs and a working distributed implementation of such systems cannot be filled simply by
applying individual techniques, such as cryptography, digital signatures, fault-tolerance
methods, etc. To support a large class of distributed decision making mechanisms over
the Internet and Intranets, a coherent distributed platform is needed wherein state-of-
the-art cryptography, fault-tolerance, etc., tools can be employed, as necessary. One of
our contributions is to bring known useful models and techniques from distributed com-
puting and software engineering to bear on the distributed implementation of distributed
mechanisms.
1.2 Related work
A number of recent papers deal with different aspects of distributed computing in con-
nection with game theory and mechanism design.
Among them, some focus on complexity such as communication complexity. Some
target computation/communication/incentive compatibility and eventually faithful im-
plementation. Others try to build a secure computation in a distributed system. More
recently, there has been a series of work on distributed constraint optimization and partial
centralized techniques.
2
The authors of [12] focused on message communication by players in a distributed
game. However, they assume that there is a center to which every player is directly con-
nected. An influential paper [7] introduced the notion of distributed algorithmic mecha-
nism design emphasizing the issues of computational complexity and incentive compati-
bility in distributed computing. Next, [14] studied the distributed implementations of the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (in short VCG) mechanism. However, in their approach there is
still a center that is ultimately responsible for selecting and enforcing the outcome.
The authors of [19] considered the problem of creating distributed system specifications
that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational (i.e., self-interested) nodes so
that no node will choose to deviate from the specification. They used interdomain routing
as an example and suggested ways to detect when nodes deviate from their specified
communication. In turn, [8] proposed in the context of secure computation a stronger
form of computation in that it solely depends on players’ rationality instead of their
honesty.
Researchers of [17] introduced the first distributed implementation of the VCG mech-
anism. The only central authority required was a bank process that collects the payments
and is in charge of the computation of taxes. The authors also discussed a method to re-
distribute some of the VCG payments back to players. This paper is most closely related
to our work and we discuss it more fully in the next subsection. Finally, [16] proposed a
new partial centralization technique, PC-DPOP, based on the DPOP algorithm of [15].
PC-DPOP provides a better control over what parts of the problem are centralized and
allows this centralization to be optimal with respect to the chosen communication struc-
ture.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper we propose a platform for distributed mechanism design that can be readily
used both in the context of the Intranet and Internet and customized to specific pur-
poses. Also it can be used for a repeated distributed decision making process, each round
involving a different group of interested players.
Our platform supports the distributed implementation of the large class of tax-based
mechanisms that implement the decisions either in dominant strategies or in an ex post
Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [10]). This aspect of our work is closest to [17] whose approach
is based on distributed constraint programming. In contrast, our approach builds upon
a very general view of distributed programming, an area that developed a variety of
techniques appropriate for the problem at hand and that is more appropriate for Internet
applications.
The main conceptual difference between our work and [17] is that we propose a more
generic design that consists of a sequence of layers by means of which secure commu-
nication in arbitrary network topologies including ring, tree, forest, and graph can be
supported and on top of which a larger range of mechanisms can be run. In contrast, in
[17], a player is randomly chosen and the players are organized in a tree with the chosen
player at its root. This allows one to minimize the number of messages needed to compute
the decision and the taxes but makes the chosen player a vulnerable part of the system.
To support the Internet-based applications we ensure connectivity between the players
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by means of a backbone of interconnected gateways and local registries. The dynamic
network creation is realized by means of players’ registration in their local registries.
This allows us to support the open system aspect of the platform by allowing the presence
of initially unknown number of interested players.
To realize concrete applications we only need to provide a backbone of local registries
and select specific registration schemes for participating in the mechanism. The former
can be taken care of by stipulating that each geographic or logical region, such as a
country, city, or Internet domain has its own local registry. Interested players can find the
addresses of their respective local registries in public fora, e.g., local government web sites.
To take care of the latter we can for example stipulate that the registration is successful
only if it took place before a certain deadline that refers to a clock in player’s region, or
if some quorum (minimum number) of registered players is reached at each local registry,
and/or if a global quorum of registered players is reached.
Our platform is built out of a number of layers. This leads to a flexible, hierarchical
design in which the lower layers are concerned only with the matters relevant for dis-
tributed computing, such as communication and synchronization issues, and are clearly
separated from the upper layers that deal with the relevant aspects of the mechanism
design, such as computation of the desired decision.
More specifically, the lowest communication layer allows us to detect process failure
and provides an asynchronous, non-order-preserving send operation. The next layer pro-
vides a message efficient, fault-tolerant distributed termination detection (see, e.g., [11])
algorithm. In turn, the high-level communication layer supports a generic broadcast
command that supports communication among players and ensures that each broadcast
message is eventually delivered to each registered player. Its implementation relies only
on the assumption that for each pair of registered players there is a path of neighbouring
processes connecting them. Any specific application, such as an appropriate instance of
the Groves mechanism (see, e.g., [10]), is realized simply as an instantiation of a top layer.
Finally, the deliberately limited GUI prevents players from tampering with the system.
In fact, the players can use the GUI only to register and to submit their types.
This layered architecture, in conjunction with the use of local registries and registration
requirement, offers a number of novel features and improvements to the approach of [17],
to wit
• we deal with a larger class of mechanisms, notably Groves mechanisms. They in-
clude the VCG mechanism, various forms of redistributions of VCG payments re-
cently studied in the literature (and considered in [17]), and the Groves mechanism
concerned with the problem of buying a path in a network, introduced in [13]. Ad-
ditionally, we can easily tailor our platform to other tax-based mechanisms, such as
Walker mechanism (see [21]),
• we support open systems in which the number of players can be unknown,
• the above-mentioned bank process of [17] is replaced by a weaker tax collector
process. It is needed only for the mechanisms that are not budget balanced, wherein
it is a passive process used only to receive messages in which some players either
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report taxes they need to pay (when the mechanism is feasible) or submit financial
claims (when the mechanism is not feasible),
• fault-tolerance is supported at various levels, including the message transmission
level and the player processes level (with an option for a restart in the case of the
detection of a failed player process),
• a multi-level protection against manipulations is provided,
• our platform makes it possible to implement distributed policing that provides an
alternative to a ‘central enforcer’ whose responsibility is to implement the outcome
decided by the agents and collect the taxes (see, e.g., [6, page 366]).
Fault-tolerance at the mechanism design level means that the final decision and taxes
can be computed even after some of the processes that broadcast the players’ types crash:
the other processes then still can proceed. Observe that detecting a non-responsive or
unreachable process as a fault and recovering the system to allow the rest of the processes
to proceed is the best that can be expected from the platform layers. What the top layer
processes do in reaction to a detected fault, whether they can reuse any of the partial
results already computed in the running mechanism, or have to restart, etc., depends on
the type of the application they are engaged in and its specific rules. Fault tolerance is
achieved by a provision of failure detection (in the BTTF layer) and by the duplication
of the computation by all players.
Such a redundancy is common in all approaches to fault-tolerance (and also used
to prevent manipulations, see [6, page 366]). In [18] it is used to realize two natural
requirements for a distributed mechanism implementation: computation compatibility
and communication compatibility. Redundancy was intentionally avoided in [17] which
aimed at minimizing the overall communication and computation costs. In our approach
it allows the fastest process to ‘dominate’ the computation and move it forward more
quickly.
This design is implemented in Java and was tested on a number of examples including
Vickrey auction with redistribution, unit demand and single-minded auctions, the problem
of buying a path in a network, and a sequential mechanism design, described briefly in
the second part of the paper and more fully in Appendix C.
1.4 Paper organization
In the next section we review the basic facts about the tax-based mechanisms, notably
the Groves family of mechanisms. Then in Section 3 we discuss the issues that need to
be taken care of when moving from the centralized tax-based mechanisms to distributed
ones and what approach we took to tackle these issues. The details of our design and
implementation are provided in Section 4.
Next, in Section 5, we discuss four important advantages of our design: security,
distributed policing and fault-tolerance and the simple way of implementing repeated
mechanisms. The aim of Section 6 is to present a number of examples of mechanisms
that we implemented using our system. Then, in Section 7 we provide conclusions and
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discuss future work. Finally, in Appendix A we discuss the details of our algorithm that
computes the tax scheme and in Appendices B and C we present a sample interaction
with our system and a more detailed account of the implemented examples.
2 Mechanism design: the classical view
We recall here briefly tax-based mechanisms, notably the family of Groves mechanisms,
see, e.g., [10, Chapter 23]. Assume a set of decisions D, a set {1, . . . , n} of players, for
each player a set of types Θi and a utility function vi : D ×Θi → R. In this context a
type is some private information known only to the player, for example a vector of player’s
valuations of the items for sale in a multi-unit auction.
A decision rule is a function f : Θ→ D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn. A decision rule
f is called efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d
′, θi),
and strategy-proof if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(θ′i, θ−i), θi),
where θ−i := (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn) and (θ′i, θ−i) := (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θ
′
i, θi+1, . . . , θn).
In mechanism design one is interested in the ways of inducing the players to announce
their true types, i.e., in transforming the decision rules to the ones that are strategy-proof.
The resulting mechanisms are called incentive compatible. In tax-based mechanisms
(called direct mechanisms in the economics literature) this is achieved by extending
the original decision rule by means of taxes that are computed by a central authority
from the vector of the received types, using players’ utility functions.
We call the tuple
(D,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f)
a decision problem. Given a decision problem, in the classical setting, one considers
then the following sequence of events, where f is a given, publicly known, decision rule:
(i) each player i receives a type θi,
(ii) each player i announces to the central authority a type θ′i; this yields a joint type
θ′ := (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
n),
(iii) the central authority then makes the decision d := f(θ′), computes the sequence of
taxes t := g(θ′), where g : Θ → Rn is a given function, and communicates to each
player i the decision d and the tax |ti| he needs to pay to (if ti ≤ 0) or to receive
from (if ti > 0) the central authority.
(iv) the resulting utility for player i is then ui(d, t) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
Each Groves mechanism is obtained using g(θ′) := (t1(θ′), . . . , tn(θ′)), where for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
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• hi : Θ−i → R is an arbitrary function,
• ti : Θ→ R is defined by1
ti(θ
′) := hi(θ′−i) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j).
Intuitively, the sum
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ
′), θ′j) represents the society benefit from the decision
f(θ′), with player i excluded.
The importance of the Groves mechanisms is revealed by the following crucial result,
in which we refer to the expanded decision rule (f, g) : Θ→ D × Rn.
Groves Theorem Suppose the decision rule f is efficient. Then in each Groves mecha-
nism the decision rule (f, g) is strategy-proof w.r.t. the utility functions u1, . . . , un.
The proof is remarkably straightforward so we reproduce it for the convenience of the
reader.
Proof. Since f is efficient, for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi we have
ui((f, g)(θi, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
≥
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, g)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).

When for a given tax-based mechanism for all θ′ we have
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
′) ≤ 0, the mecha-
nism is called feasible (which means that it can be realized without external financing)
and when for all θ′ we have
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
′) = 0, the mechanism is called budget balanced
(which means that it can be realized without a deficit).
Each Groves mechanism depends on the functions h1, . . ., hn. A special case, called
Clarke mechanism, or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (in short VCG) is ob-
tained by using
hi(θ
′
−i) := −max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θ
′
j).
So then
ti(θ
′) :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j)−max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θ
′
j).
Hence for all θ′ and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti(θ′) ≤ 0, which means that the VCG
mechanism is feasible and that each player needs to make the payment |ti(θ′)| to the
1
∑
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j 6= i.
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central authority. Other feasible Groves mechanisms exist in which some players receive
payments and others have to make payments, for example the one proposed in [5]. Yet
other Groves mechanisms are not feasible, for example the one concerned with buying a
path in a network, due to [13]. In that mechanism the players with non-zero taxes need
to receive the payments from central authority. We discuss these examples in Subsection
6.1.
3 Our approach
In our approach we relax a number of the assumptions made when introducing mechanism
design. More specifically we assume that
• there is no central authority,
• players interested in participating in a specific mechanism register to join an open
system wherein that mechanism runs. A tax collector process is part of this system,
• the players whose registration is accepted inform other registered players about their
types,
• once a registered player learns that he has received the types from all registered
players, he computes the decision and the taxes, sends this information to other
registered players, and possibly the tax collector process, and terminates his com-
putation.
We also assume that there is no collusion among the players. This leads to an im-
plementation of the mechanism design by means of anonymous (i.e., name independent)
distributed processes, in absence of any central authority. Because of the distributed
nature of this approach no global state, in particular no global clock, exists. The compu-
tation of the decision and of the taxes is carried out by the players themselves.
3.1 Player processes and local registries
As it stands, this revised setting is not clear on a number of counts. First, we need to
clarify the registration process, in particular what it implies and when it ends. In our
approach each player is represented by a process, in short a player process. A player who
wishes to join a specific mechanism (e.g., an auction) must register with a local registry.
Local registries are linked together in a network that satisfies the full reachability condition
described in Subsection 4.2 (and we assume one of them is designated as the initiator
mentioned in that subsection). Receiving his registration request, a local registry verifies
the eligibility of a player (e.g., whether his IP address puts him under the jurisdiction
of this registry) and accepts his request if the registration conditions for the specific
mechanism (e.g., a deadline) are met.
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3.2 Generic broadcast command
Second, once the registration process ends, in the resulting network a player process may
not know the identities of other player processes, so the announcement of one’s type to
all other players needs to be explained. In our approach we assume that once a player
process is registered, it joins the network of (registry and player) processes wherein a
generic broadcast command is available. The implementation of this command relies
only on the assumption that for each pair of players there is a path of neighbouring
processes connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network topologies in a
simple way.
The topology of this network is irrelevant both from the point of view of the individual
processes, as well as the semantics of the broadcast command. The full reachability of
the backbone network of local registries is enough to ensure that as long as each player
process knows and is known by its local registry, full reachability also holds for the whole
network. The broadcast command uses the connectivity of this network to ensure that
a copy of a broadcast message is eventually delivered to every registered player in finite
time. These messages are transmitted through paths managed in a lower layer which the
player processes cannot access.
This automatically prevents manipulation by player processes of messages originating
from or destined for other players. Such manipulations are possible in other schemes,
such as in [6, page 366], where the player processes connected in a ring are computing
a Vickrey (second-price) auction of a single good. The processes are expected to pass
around a message containing the top two bids for that good. This opens the possibility
of cheating by a process by simply manipulating the messages that it is expected to pass
through. Indeed, by putting a high bid and by substantially lowering the second lowest
bid a player process can get the good more cheaply (at least when it is the last player
process to bid). In our set up a player process cannot access the bids of other player
processes before broadcasting its own bid (unless one explicitly considers a sequential set
up, see Subsection 6.2). Moreover, no messages destined for a player process pass through
another player process.
3.3 Distributed termination detection
Third, we need to clarify how each player process will know that he indeed received the
types announced by all other registered players. We solve this problem by assuming that
each player process after broadcasting the player’s type participates in a distributed
termination detection algorithm the aim of which is to learn whether all players have
indeed broadcast their types. This algorithm is tailored to deal with the communication
by means of multicasting (which subsumes broadcasting).
If this algorithm detects termination, the player process knows that he indeed received
all types, and in particular can determine at this stage the number of players and their
(alias) names. From that moment on each player process uses the same naming scheme
when referring to other player processes. The uniqueness is ensured by a local scheme
for generating globally unique player identifiers. More generally, we use the distributed
termination detection algorithm to delineate the end of each phase of the distributed
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computation: registration, type broadcast, etc., i.e., for barrier synchronization (see,
e.g., [1]).
This allows us to deal with the repeated mechanisms that involve several rounds of
decision making by means of the same given mechanism, each time involving a possibly
different group of players. To this end we need to logically separate each round of the
mechanism. This is handled, using our distributed termination detection algorithm for
barrier synchronization.
3.4 Tax schemes
Fourth, to ensure the correctness of the above approach, it is crucial that each player
process computes the same decision and the same information concerning taxes. The
former is taken care of by the fact that each player process uses the same, publicly known,
decision rule f that each player learns, for example from a public bulletin board, and that
is used by the player process after its registration is accepted.
Further, each player process applies f to the same input θ′ and computes the same
tax scheme by which we mean a specific vector of payments tax(t1), . . . tax(tn) computed
from the tax vector (t1, . . . , tn), where tax(tj) specifies the amounts that player j has to
pay to other players and possibly the tax collector from his tax tj. All tax schemes
tax(t1), . . . tax(tn) then determine ‘who pays how much to whom’. In general most taxes
equal 0, so we optimize the computation by generating reduced tax schemes in which
only non-zero entries are listed and by multicasting them instead of broadcasting.
Note also that to compute the taxes each player process needs to know the utility
functions of other player processes. This simply means that each player knows that all
the players are participating in the same mechanism (for instance unit demand auction).
The tax collector process is only needed for the mechanisms that are not budget balanced.
4 Implementation
Our distributed mechanism design system is implemented in Java using threads and sock-
ets. The implementation follows the guidelines explained in the previous section. Figure 1
shows the overall architecture of our system and the different layers of software used in
its implementation.
The first two layers provide support for asynchronous communication and an appro-
priate fault-tolerant distributed termination detection algorithm for arbitrary network
topologies with the asynchronous broadcasting as the communication primitive. Their
implementation is about 9K lines of Java code. The implementation of the remainder of
the system (developed by the third author) is about 4K lines of Java code. Each entity in
this architecture communicates, either through function calls or method invocations, only
with its adjacent entities. Specific applications are realized by instantiating the crucial
player process layer.
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Figure 1: Implementation architecture
4.1 Low Level Communication
The Low Level Communication (LLC) is a thin layer that supports (1) locally generated,
globally unique process identifiers, and (2) reliable non-order-preserving, asynchronous,
targeted communication, exclusively through the exchange of passive messages between
processes.2 The only means of communication between processes in LLC is through
message passing, where no transfer of control takes place when messages are exchanged.
A message sent to a non-existent (terminated or failed) process will be returned to its
sender intact, in finite but indeterminate time (a time-out).
The interface provided by the LLC layer contains the two operations llsend(m, r)
and llreceive(m, t). The llsend(m, r) operation sends the message m to its target
process r and returns a Boolean value that indicates the success or failure of the operation.
A send operation may fail, for instance, if the size of the message is above the capacity
threshold of the transport mechanism. Successful send simply means that the message
has been dispatched on its way to its specified target.
The llreceive(m, t) operation blocks its calling process, p, until either (a) a message
sent to p has arrived, or (b) the specified time-out t has expired. In the first case,
llreceive() returns true and passes the received message in m. In the second case, this
function returns false to indicate that the time-out t has expired.
4.2 BTTF
The Back To The Future (BTTF) layer implements a message efficient, fault-tolerant
distributed termination detection (DTD) algorithm, on top of the LLC layer. The details
of the BTTF DTD algorithm lie beyond the scope of this paper and will be described
elsewhere.
The DTD functionality provided by the BTTF layer can be used for barrier synchro-
nization as well as for termination detection. Once termination has been detected, the
calling process knows that all processes in the system have reached the same ‘termination
barrier’. This termination barrier is either the actual termination of the processes, or the
2This layer consists of just some 700 lines of code and any low-level message passing mechanism that
provides asynchronous, non-order-preserving send and receive can be used instead of it.
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virtual termination of only the current phase of the activity in the system. In the first
case, the calling process must perform its local clean-up and terminate. In the second
case, the process must start a new phase of its computation by calling the initialization
function of the BTTF layer once more.
The implementation of the BTTF layer requires only the llsend(m, r) and llreceive(m,
t) operations provided by the LLC layer. It provides an interface that supports the fol-
lowing functions:
• initializeBTTFWave(. . .) This function initializes the calling process, enabling it
to participate in the global computation. The details of the parameters of this
function are beyond the scope of this paper.
• send(m, T) This function implements a delayed multicast operation. It schedules
a copy of the message m to be sent to every process in the target set of processes
T. The actual dispatch of the messages to their specified targets will take place
upon a subsequent call to one of the functions prioritySend(), receive(), or
passiveReceive().
• prioritySend(m, T) This function implements a multicast operation. It first sends
all messages scheduled by earlier calls to send(), if any, and then sends a copy of
the message m to every process in the target set of processes T.
• receive(m, t) The parameter t is an integer value. Negative t values indicate
indefinite wait, and non-negative values specify a time-out value in milliseconds. A
call to this function blocks until either the specified time-out expires, or a message
sent to the calling process is available. If the specified time-out expires, the return
result of this function is false and the value of m is undefined. If a received message
is available, this function returns the message in m and returns true.
• passiveReceive(m) A call to this function blocks until either global termination (of
the current phase of the computation) is detected, or a message sent to the calling
process is available. If termination is detected, the return result of this function
is false and the value of m is undefined. If a received message is available, this
function returns the message in m and returns true.
• hadFailureInLastPhase() This function returns a Boolean that indicates whether
the last terminated phase involved a failed process.
4.3 High Level Communication and Registry
The High Level Communication (HLC) layer provides indirect, anonymous communica-
tion among the players in a distributed system. It includes a number of local registries
whose mutual connectivity supports the full connectivity of the players necessary for
broadcast. A player must sign-in at a local registry, after which it can use the other
operations provided by the HLC layer to take part in the mechanism. It provides the
following functions:
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• signin(r, mech) This function allows the calling player process to sign at the local
registry r so that it can take part in the mechanism mech. The player can start the
first phase of the mechanism mech right after a successful return of a call to this
function.
• signout(mech) This function terminates the participation of the calling player pro-
cess in the mechanism mech.
• bsend(m) This function broadcasts the message m to all registered players in the
game.
• msend(m, T) This function multicasts the message m to every player in the target
set T.
• receive(m, t), passiveReceive(m), hadFailureInLastPhase() These functions
are the same as their homonyms in the BTTF layer.
Each local registry is responsible for processing the registrations of the player processes
according to the assumed registration criteria. Also, it maintains for each implemented
mechanism a corresponding locking policy. Each such policy regulates the conditions
under which the player processes can receive messages sent to them or can broadcast or
multicast messages. It is loaded each time a player process successfully registers. We shall
return to this matter in the next subsection and in Section 6.2.
4.4 Player Process
Specific applications are implemented using this top layer. It is built on top of the HLC
layer and is used to implement specific actions of the players, in particular the computation
of the decisions and taxes. In our implementation of the distributed mechanism design the
following sequence of actions takes place for each player i, where flag is a local Boolean
variable. By termination loop we mean here the statement
while (passiveReceive(m)) {
process message m;
}
if (hadFailureInLastPhase()) {
escalate detected failure;
}
and by inspect loop we mean the statement
flag = false;
while (receive(m, 100)) {
if (m is the pair (decision, tax scheme)) {
flag = true;
process message m;
}
}
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where 100 is some arbitrary time-out in miliseconds.
The first loop allows the calling process to learn that all registered player processes
and the tax collector process have reached the same phase in the distributed computation.
At the end of the loop, if the just terminated phase involved a process failure, this fact
is escalated in an application-dependent manner (e.g., by setting a flag or calling an ap-
propriate function) for proper handling. In turn, the inspection loop is used to determine
whether another process has already computed the decision and the tax scheme.
The details of the processing of each received message m depend on the context.
(i) process pi representing player i is created and assigned a globally unique name,
(ii) pi obtains player i’s type,
(iii) pi signs in at the local registry r in its region using the signin(r, mech) call,
(iv) if pi receives the confirmation of the registration (the call of signin(r, mech) is
successful), it broadcasts player i’s type using the bsend() function (and otherwise
it terminates),
(v) pi performs the termination loop. The corresponding process m statement in this
loop consists of storing the type received from another registered player process.
When this loops properly ends (that is, when pi has received the types from all
registered player processes and the global termination is detected) pi has a globally
unique naming scheme at its disposal to refer to the registered player processes, and
the number of registered players n that equals the number of types it has received,
(vi) pi performs the inspect loop. If another process has already computed the decision
and the tax scheme, flag will be set true,
(vii) if flag is not true, pi computes the decision and the tax scheme of the players
and multicasts using the msend() function the decision and the tax scheme to the
processes representing players who need to pay or receive taxes and the decision to
the other processes. If pi needs to pay some tax to the tax collector (respectively,
to receive some tax return), it sends this information to the tax collector process
using the msend() function,
(viii) pi performs the termination loop,
(ix) when it properly ends and after pi receives from the tax collector process the in-
formation about the total amount of taxes (respectively, financial claims) the tax
collector received, pi performs the termination loop again and terminates.
The last item refers to the tax collector process, described below, with which all player
processes jointly synchronize their computation phases. One of the tasks of this process
is to compute the aggregate tax and communicate it to the player processes. The de-
tails of the tax scheme algorithm can be found in Appendix A. The above description
of the player process assumes that the underlying mechanism is simultaneous. The cor-
responding locking policy, loaded by the local registry, blocks the receive(m, t) and
passiveReceive(m) functions of the pi process until it has broadcast its type.
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4.5 Tax Collector Software Interface
This layer is built on top of the HLC layer. It provides two functions also available in
the HLC layer, passiveReceive(m) and bsend(m), and two new functions, tsignin(r,
mech) and tsignout(mech), which are the counterparts of the signin(r, mech) and
signout(mech) functions of the HLC layer and which are used to deal with the tax
collector process registration.
4.6 Tax Collector Process
This layer is built on top of the Tax Collector Software Interface layer and is used to
implement the actions of the tax collector which is in charge of collecting players’ taxes.
The following sequence of actions takes place for it:
(i) The tax collector process ta representing the tax collector is created and assigned a
globally unique name known to every player. It signs in at the local registry in his
region using the tsignin(r, mech) call (which always succeeds),
(ii) ta performs the termination loop,
(iii) ta performs the termination loop again. When it ends, the tax collector process
has received all the taxes (respectively, financial claims) from the players. They are
kept on a single account,
(iv) ta broadcasts the information about the total amount on its single account to all
players,
(v) ta performs the termination loop and terminates.
4.7 Player GUI
The interaction between the player (user) and the system is realized in this interface. The
interaction is limited to the registration, type submission and tax reception.
4.8 The Initialization Phase
Before a session of a given mechanism can start, a number of processes and servers must
be up and running. Every mechanism has its own specific “game server” (Gserver) which
is identified by a unique <http-address>:<port-id>. This URL will be publicized for
people who want to create and add new processes, such as player processes, local registries,
and tax collector processes, that will join the current session of the mechanism. The
Gserver ensures that no player process enters the mechanism before the necessary local
registry and the tax collector processes are enrolled.
Each mechanism also has a second dedicated server, called the “communication server”
(Cserver). Generally, the Cserver sits at a different machine-and-port address than the
Gserver and is used internally only. Its functionality is completely generic and application
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independent, while the Gserver’s functionality is application dependent, which explains
why these two servers are separate.
The role of the Gserver is to perform mechanism specific authentication necessary to
make sure that only authorized processes enter the game. Once this is done, the Gserver
gives the IP address of its Cserver, together with an appropriate authorization key, to its
client process, which enables the latter to contact the Cserver and authenticate itself for
the proper communication services that it is entitled to.
The role of the Cserver is to enable pairs of processes that run on different machines
to dynamically establish communication links between themselves. When the Cserver
receives a connection request, it searches its tables to find a match for this request. The
details of the rules by which two requests can match is beyond the scope of this paper. In
its simplest form, two requests to establish communication by two parties match if each
explicitly specifies the other party by name or by category (i.e., player, registry, etc.).
If no match is possible for a new request, depending on the value of one of its fields,
it is either dropped, or retained in the internal tables of the Cserver (for a possible match
with a future request) and the client is notified accordingly. If a match is possible, then
the Cserver replies to the two clients, providing each with the address and the port-id
of the other, which subsequently proceed to establish their direct communication link
accordingly.
To start the system for a new session of a mechanism, its Gserver is first manually
started up and its address is publicized. The first thing that the Gserver does is to (create,
if necessary and) connect to a dedicated Cserver for this application and complete their
initialization by exchanging some identification information. The Gserver is then ready
to accept processes that wish to join this session of the mechanism.
Once a process receives its successful authentification reply from the Gserver, it com-
pletes its initialization by issuing some appropriate requests to the Cserver to establish
communication links with the other processes in the application. The details of these re-
quests depend on the type of the process involved. We only mention them for the player
processes.
A player process contacts the Gserver and presents its credentials. Once authenticated,
the Gserver replies to its successful authentication request supplying the player with the
address of the Cserver and the player’s authorization key. It also sends in its reply the
id of the local registry where the player must register. The player process then sends a
request to the Cserver announcing its readiness to communicate with its local registry.
Once its communication link with its local registry is established, the player process signs
in at the local registry (see item (iii) in Subsection 4.4). If the registration is confirmed
(item (iv)), the local registry assigns the IP address of a gateway to the player process.
The player is then ready to take part in this session of the mechanism.
Gateways play no functional role in the mechanism. They exist only to ensure the
full connectivity of the network in its backbone of secure hosts, thereby relieving the
application layer of the concern for its full connectivity. A gateway is a functionally
empty process that acts as a bridge and forwards the (control) messages of the BTTF
layer. We assume sufficient redundancy (in the number of gateways and their buddy sets3)
3Every process must maintain a set of identifiers of k ≥ 0 other processes in the system, called
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to ensure full connectivity of the gateway processes exists.
4.9 Possible Realization
Figure 2: Possible realization of the platform
The architecture presented in this section allows multiple alternative implementations,
in each of which the constituents that comprise each layer get allocated to run on a
different set of hosts. Figure 2 shows an example mapping of constituents to ‘logical
hosts’. In any concrete implementation one or more such logical hosts can represent the
same actual physical host.
At the core of Figure 2 lies a communications network, represented by the cloud
shape, that interconnects a number of hosts to provide the functionality described in the
LLC layer in Subsection 4.1. The specific hosts connected to this network that concern
us are a set of gateway hosts that run the BTTF and the HLC layers.4
its buddies. The buddies of processes are transparently used by the BTTF Wave algorithm to detect
termination. The only requirement on the buddy sets of processes is that they must collectively provide
full reachability.
4By a gateway host we mean here a host that acts as an entry point to the communication network
for player processes.
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The ring of hosts around the core in Figure 2 contains the set of hosts that run the
local registries. Every local registry has a primary connection to a gateway host in the
core. Thus, the full reachability of the gateway hosts in the core ensures full reachability
among local registries.
The next ring of hosts in Figure 2 contains hosts that run player processes.
Each player process establishes an initial link (dotted lines) with a local registry (whose
address it obtains from the Gserver) to register. As part of this registration process, its
local registry provides the address of a gateway host with which the player process then
establishes its primary communication link (solid lines) for the rest of the game.
Finally, the outermost ring in Figure 2 consists merely of computers that run GUI
programs that link to their respective player processes.
5 Extensions
Let us discuss now some consequences of our design and some of its extensions.
5.1 Security
The ‘ring structure’ depicted in Figure 2 provides a multiple protection scheme against
manipulations by the players. First, the assignment of a gateway host to the player
process, provided by the local registries, is done dynamically. So there is no way for
a player process to know before-hand which host its local registry will propose as its
gateway.
Next, the only messages that pass through a local registry are the ones involving its
locally registered players. Likewise, the only messages that pass through a player process
are the ones originating from or destined for that specific player. This, as already men-
tioned in Section 3, automatically prevents manipulation by player processes of messages
originating from or destined for other players.
Further, the end users have physical access only to the outermost hosts that run the
GUI programs, which severely restricts the range of their potentially dangerous actions.
Finally, the separation of the GUI programs from the player processes allows us to run
the latter on hosts to which end users do not have physical access.
Note also that the reliance on the registration process allows the users to use the High
Level Communication (HLC) layer in a ‘safe mode’. In such a mode the users can trust
the security of the messages they exchange through a ‘public’ communications system, by
relying on the encryption of the messages using the public key cryptography. This can be
achieved, for example, by modifying the first call of the termination loop, in action (v)
of Subsection 4.4, so that it includes the collection of public keys of the registered players.
Subsequent messages sent by player processes can from that moment on be encrypted
with recipients’ public keys.
In many applications it can be advisable to mask the identity of the players, that is,
to make it impossible to derive the identity of the player from the name of the process
representing it. This can be easily done by modifying action (iv) of Subsection 4.4, so
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that once player process pi receives the confirmation of the registration it also receives a
new (globally unique) name, securely generated by the local registry.
We do assume that the communications network, gateways and local registries run
on secure hosts. The security issues involved here are generic and independent of the
properties and characteristics of any specific mechanism in which the players may engage.
However, we do not assume that player processes run on secure hosts, thus allow for the
possibility that they can be tampered with or tailor made, to let their end users cheat.
In the next subsection we discuss how to deal with this problem.
5.2 Distributed Policing
One possibility to tamper with the system consists of altering the code of a player process
so that it sends to some players a falsified decision or a falsified tax scheme. By policing
we mean here a sequence of actions that will lead to the exclusion of such processes (that
we call dishonest). The qualification ‘distributed’ refers to the fact that the policing is
done by the player processes themselves, without intervention of any central authority.
Below we call a player process honest if it multicasts a true tax scheme.
The difficulty in implementing distributed policing lies in the fact that dishonest pro-
cesses may behave inconsistently. To resolve this problem we use the registries which are
assumed to be reliable. We then modify the sequence of actions of each player process so
that it always computes the decision and the tax scheme but sends them only to its local
registry. The local registry then dispatches the decision and the tax scheme on behalf
of its sender to all player processes mentioned in the tax scheme and the decision to the
other processes. As a trusted intermediary, the registry ensures that the same tax scheme
is sent to all player processes involved, and that no player process can send more than
one tax scheme in a single phase.
The resulting sequence of actions performed by each player process pi is now as follows,
where the new steps are (vi)–(viii):
(i) process pi representing player i is created and assigned a globally unique name,
(ii) pi obtains player i’s type,
(iii) pi signs in at the local registry r in its region,
(iv) if pi receives the confirmation of the registration it broadcasts player i’s type and
otherwise it terminates,
(v) pi performs the termination loop,
(vi) pi computes the decision and the tax scheme of the players and sends this informa-
tion to its local registry, requesting the latter to dispatch this information, on its
behalf, to all other player processes,
(vii) pi collects the decisions and the tax schemes dispatched by all other player processes.
By comparing them with the true decision and tax scheme computed by itself, pi
identifies the set of honest player processes, honesti,
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(viii) pi performs the termination loop and terminates.
Note that upon termination each player process pj has the same set honestj. This way
all honest processes gain the common knowledge of their own identities, which makes it
possible for them to ‘reconvene’ in the case a falsified tax scheme was sent, or to finalize
the tax handling with the tax collector otherwise.
5.3 Fault-tolerance
Our system supports fault-tolerance on various levels. First, the llsend(m, r) operation
of the Lower Level Communication (LLC) layer returns a Boolean value that indicates its
success or failure, so it provides a provision for recovery.
Next, the BTTF algorithm from the BTTF layer detects persistent process failures.
This means that should any process crash or otherwise become non-responsive or unreach-
able at any time, the rest of the processes in the distributed system can recover from this
failure and still reach termination. BTTF uses probing to accomplish this, nevertheless,
the details of this protocol are not relevant in the context of this paper. The BTTF layer
provides an inquiry function to the application layer that enables it to determine whether
or not a process failed during the last phase whose termination was detected. Thus, the
termination loop in our application can inform the mechanism design level about the
existence of failed processes, which can then react appropriately to process failure.
Fault-tolerance on the mechanism design level has to address two possibilities.
1. Some player processes crash before they broadcast their players types. To deal
with this problem we implemented the following procedure. In the first place the
description of a given application is augmented by a deadline to react in the form of
an absolute time, available to each local registry. Recall that the actual broadcast
of the type of each player process pi representing player i is actually carried out
by its local registry. When the deadline passes, each local registry makes a list of
the player processes that successfully registered at it and from whom it did not
receive their types. Each local registry then informs other player processes about
the exclusion of these crashed player processes, so that the decision and the tax
schemes can now be computed only by the player processes that met the deadline.
2. Some player processes crash after they broadcast their players types. This con-
tingency is discovered by each player process by means of the termination loop
performed in step (viii) of the last subsection. How to deal with this problem is
application dependent.
In some applications the final decision and the tax scheme can be easily modified
by all other player processes. For instance, in the problem of buying a path in a
network discussed in Subsection 6.1, if a single player process crashes, the other
player processes can always choose another path in the network. However, in other
problems the whole decision process has to be restarted or aborted. This is for
instance the case in the public project problem (also discussed in Subsection 6.1)
when a pivotal player process crashes, i.e., its tax changes the status of the project
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from carrying it out to dropping it. Then the sufficient level of funding is not
available anymore.
5.4 Repeated mechanisms
Finally, let us discuss the problem of implementing repeated mechanisms that consist of
several rounds of the same mechanism, each round involving possibly different players.
As a simple example, suppose that we are dealing with the repeated rounds of a single
item auction and that the players are not allowed to purchase more than one item.
In each round different player processes may be admitted on the basis of some informa-
tion that needs to be maintained in the local registries (like who were the winners in the
previous rounds of the single item auction). This means that the player processes should
now send the computed decision and the tax scheme also to the local registries. Then
information maintained at the local registry allows us to maintain a specific registration
scheme used throughout the repeated mechanism.
Apart from this modification the implementation is straightforward thanks to the fact
that all stages of the distributed computation involving the player processes and the tax
collector process have been properly separated by the calls of the termination loop.
Consequently, the implementation of repeated mechanisms can be obtained as a simple
modification of the implementation discussed in Section 4.
Namely, we assume that the processes representing all players are created first, that is
assume that the step (i) of Subsection 4.4 is performed once for all players who will take
part in some round of the considered mechanism. Further we assume that the step (i) of
Subsection 4.6 is performed once by the tax collector process. Then we simply iterate the
rounds of the mechanism, where each round consists of the steps (ii)–(ix) of Subsection
4.4 for all player processes, and of the steps (ii)–(v) of the tax collector process.
6 Examples
We used our distributed mechanism design system in a number of test cases. Each of them
is implemented as an instantiation of the player process layer described in Subsection 4.4.
6.1 Groves mechanisms
We start by discussing briefly the implemented Groves mechanisms. A more detailed
description of them is given in Appendix C.
Vickrey auction In Vickrey auction there is a single object for sale which is allocated
to the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. Our distributed implementation
required addition of only 60 lines of code.
Vickrey auction with redistribution We also implemented the proposal of [4] and
[5] in which the highest bidder redistributes some amounts from his payment to other
players. As shown in [2] this Groves mechanism minimizes the overall tax.
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Public projects The public project problem, see [10], deals with the problem of taking
a joint decision concerning construction of a discrete public good, for example a bridge.
Each player needs to report his valuation from the project when it takes place. If the
sum of the valuations exceeds the cost of the project, the project takes place and each
player has to pay the same fraction of the cost. Otherwise the project is canceled. We
implemented for this problem the VCG mechanism.
Unit demand auction In this auction there are multiple items offered for sale. We
assume that there are n players and m items and that each player submits a valuation
for each item. The items should be allocated in such a way that each player receives at
most one of them and the aggregated valuation is maximal.
To compute the decision in the VCG mechanism we used the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm
to compute the maximum weighted matching, where the weight associated with the edge
(j, i) is the valuation for item j reported by player i. In our implementation we used the
Java source code available at http://adn.cn/blog/article.asp?id=49. To compute
the tax for player i in the VCG mechanism this algorithm is used again, computing the
maximum weighted matching with player i excluded.
Single-minded auction In this auction studied in [9] there are n players and m items,
with each player only interested in a specific set of items (which explains the name of
the auction). We implemented the VCG mechanism for the situation in which each
player i is only interested in a consecutive sequence ai, . . . , bi of the items 1, . . . ,m, with
1 ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ m. The computations of the decision and of the taxes involve computations
of the maximum weighted matchings.
We note that in general, when each player is interested in an arbitrary subset of the
items, the computation of the decision in the VCG mechanism is NP-hard, see [9].
Buying a path in a network This Groves mechanism, due to [13], is concerned with
the problem of buying a path in a network. Consider a communication network, modelled
as a directed graph G := (V,E) (with no self-cycles or parallel edges). We assume that
each edge e ∈ E is owned by (a different) player e. We fix two vertices s, t ∈ V and
assume that for every edge e there is a s− t path in G with the edge e removed.
Each player (owning the edge) e submits the cost θe of using e. The central authority
selects on the basis of players’ submissions the shortest s− t path in G. This mechanism
is not feasible and all players whose edges are selected submit financial claims to the
tax collector. The decision and the taxes are computed in a straightforward way, using
Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm.
6.2 Other mechanisms
Additionally, we implemented the following two mechanisms that are not Groves mecha-
nisms.
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Sequential Groves mechanisms In the original set up of the decision problem all
players announce their types independently. In a modification studied in [3] the types are
announced sequentially, in a random order.
Suppose that the random order is 1, . . . , n. The crucial difference between the cus-
tomary set up and the one now considered is that player i knows the types announced by
players 1, . . . , i−1. In [3] it was shown that in Groves mechanisms used for problems con-
cerned with public projects players have then other natural strategies than truth-telling
(i.e., announcing their true type). The nature of these strategies was clarified by show-
ing that when this mechanism is transformed to a simultaneous one, the vector of the
proposed strategies forms a Pareto optimal ex post Nash equilibrium in a large class of
so-called optimal strategies. In particular the overall tax is minimized.
Sequential Groves mechanisms can be implemented by means of our distributed mech-
anism system using the appropriate locking policy loaded by the local registries. This
locking policy takes care that when process pi receives the confirmation of the registra-
tion, it includes its sequence number j and information whether it represents the last
player (the latter is needed to use other optimal strategies than truth-telling). Then the
receive(m, t) and passiveReceive(m) functions of pi are partly blocked so that only
the messages sent by processes representing players with sequence number < j can be
received, and the bsend() function is blocked until pi has received the types from these
j − 1 processes. We used this approach to implement the specific sequential mechanism
for the public project problem introduced in [3].
Walker mechanism This mechanism, introduced in [21] deals with the continuous
public goods (for example grass area in a city). Each player i has a utility function of
the form vi(q) := bi(q) − ci(q). Here q is the total amount of a continuous public good
produced by the players, bi(q) is the benefit for player i from the amount of q of public
good, and ci(q) is the cost share player i has to pay.
Each player i reports a real number xi, which is interpreted as the amount of public
good he agrees to produce. Then he receives the payment (tax)
ti(x) := (xi+1 − xi−1)
n∑
j=1
xj,
where we interpret n + 1 as 1 and 1 − 1 as n, that is i + 1 and i − 1 are the indices
of the right-hand and left-hand neighbours of player i in a ring. So x =
∑n
j=1 xj is the
total amount of public good produced and the final utility for player i is of the form
ui(x) := vi(x) + ti(x).
Walker mechanism is not a Groves mechanism and it implements the decision not in
dominant strategies but in an ex post Nash equilibrium.5 Still, to implement it we again
merely modified the player process layer. To test the implementation we used specific
functions bi and ci.
5In an ex post Nash equilibrium no player can gain by deviating from his strategy even if he knows
the types of the other players.
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7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we discussed a design and implementation of a platform that supports
distributed mechanism design and that can be customized to specific Internet-based ap-
plications.
We believe that the proposed platform clarifies how the design of systems support-
ing distributed decision making through the Internet can profit from sound and proven
principles of software engineering, such as separation of concerns and hierarchical design.
The discussed platform is built as a sequence of layers. The lower layers provide support
for distributed computing, while the upper ones are concerned only with the matters spe-
cific to mechanism design. Specific Internet-based applications can be readily realized by
creating a backbone of local registries and selecting appropriate registration details.
We found that the division of the software into layers resulted in a flexible design
that could be easily customized to specific mechanisms proposed in the literature, such
as (sequential) Groves mechanisms and Walker mechanism, and to specific applications,
such as various forms of auctions. For example, as already mentioned, our distributed
implementation of Vickrey auction required modification of a module of only 60 lines of
code. Additionally, this layered architecture offers a multi-level protection scheme against
manipulations, distributed policing and supports fault-tolerance.
We also provided evidence that software engineering in the area of multiagent systems
can profit from the techniques developed in the area of distributed computing, for exam-
ple broadcasting in an environment with an unknown number of processes, distributed
termination and barrier synchronization.
In our work we have not dealt with the problem of false-name bids, see [22], that needs
to be addressed anew in the context of distributed implementations. This is the subject
of our current research. Also, we plan to use our system to implement continuous double
auctions.
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Appendix A
We explain here the details of the reduced tax scheme algorithm mentioned in Section
3. Intuitively, this algorithm determines given the tax vector (t1, . . . , tn) ‘who pays how
much to whom’.
We consider a list Lall of players, each with his tax, and assume that -1 is the identity
of the tax collector. First the players are divided into two lists, Lneg, consisting of players
whose taxes are negative (i.e., those who should pay the taxes) and Lpos consisting of
players whose taxes are strictly positive (i.e., those who should be paid). Players whose
tax is 0 are omitted.
We start with the first player on the list Lneg, player A
0
neg, and compare the absolute
value of his tax, |t0neg|, with the tax t0pos of the first player on the list Lpos, player A0pos. If
26
|t0neg| < t0pos, then player A0neg pays the amount |t0neg| to player A0pos. This changes the tax
of player A0pos from t
0
pos to t
0
pos + t
0
neg. The process is now repeated with the next player
who should pay a tax, A1neg, and player A
0
pos. If |t0neg| = t0pos, the same happens but the
process is repeated with players A1neg and A
1
pos.
If |t0neg| > t0pos, player A0neg pays the amount t0pos to player A0pos. This changes the tax
of player A0neg from t
0
neg to t
0
neg + t
0
pos. The process is now repeated with player A
0
neg and
the next unpaid player, A1pos.
The loop stops when either all players with negative taxes paid or all players with
strictly positive taxes were paid. If the mechanism is not budget balanced, upon termina-
tion either each player l who at this moment still needs to pay taxes (his tax is negative)
pays it to the tax collector —this is represented by the triple (l, |tlneg|,−1)— or each player
l who at this moment still should be paid (his tax is strictly positive) sends his financial
claim to the tax collector —this is represented by the triple (l,−tlpos,−1).
The pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Figure 3.
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Lall is the list of players;
all is the length of the list Lall;
Ai is the (i + 1)st player in the list Lall;
ti is the tax of player Ai;
tax is the list representing the computed tax scheme;
tax = nil; neg = 0; pos = 0;
for i = 0 to all do
if ti < 0 then
append Ai to the list Lneg;
neg = neg + 1;
else
if ti > 0 then
append Ai to the list Lpos;
pos = pos + 1;
end
end
end
Ajneg is the (j + 1)st player in the list Lneg;
tjneg is the tax of player A
j
neg;
Akpos is the (k + 1)st player in the list Lpos;
tkpos is the tax of player A
k
pos;
j = 0;
k = 0;
while j < neg and k < pos do
if |tjneg| ≤ tkpos then
append (j, |tjneg|, k) to the list tax; % Ajneg pays the amount |tjneg| to Akpos
tkpos = t
k
pos + t
j
neg;
j = j + 1;
if |tkpos| == 0 then
k = k + 1
end
else
append (j, tjpos, k) to the list tax; % A
j
neg pays the amount tkpos to A
k
pos
tjneg = t
j
neg + tkpos;
k = k + 1;
end
end
if j < neg then
for l = j to neg − 1 do
append (l, |tlneg|,−1) to the list tax; % Alneg pays the amount |tlneg| to the tax
collector
end
end
if k < pos then
for l = k to pos− 1 do
append (l,−tlpos,−1) to the list tax; % Alneg claims the amount tlpos from the tax
collector
end
end
Figure 3: The algorithm to compute reduced tax scheme
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we present an example interaction with the platform. This test was
run on three PCs, thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl, testhp.liacs.nl and mexico.science.uva.nl, located
respectively at CWI, University of Amsterdam and University of Leiden. Their IP ad-
dresses are shown in Figure 4. We assume that each player chooses from the pull down
Figure 4: Three PCs at three locations.
menu a single-minded auction, discussed in Section 6. We consider a specific instance
with
• 3 items for sale,
• 2 local registries, thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8802 and mexico.science.uva.nl:8803; we use
time as a deadline for registration,
• 1 tax collector thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8801,
• 6 players: player testhp.liacs.nl:8806–8809 and mexico.science.uva.nl:8804–8805 who
register randomly in two local registries. Among these six players, we arrange that
one player, testhp.liacs.nl:8809, is a latecomer who registers after the deadline, and
as a result is not accepted to participate in the auction,
• the following players’ bids:
testhp.liacs.nl:8806: 20(1,2), testhp.liacs.nl:8807: 50(3),
testhp.liacs.nl:8808: 32:(2), mexico.science.uva.nl:8805: 60(2,3),
mexico.science.uva.nl:8804: 19(1),
that is player testhp.liacs.nl:8806 bids 20 for the bundle (1,2), etc.,
• 3 PCs: PC1 (thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl), PC2 (testhp.liacs.nl), and PC3 (mexico.science.uva.nl);
PC1 runs the tax collector (thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8801) and the local registry (thor-
bjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8802); PC2 runs four players (testhp.liacs.nl:8806–8809), and PC3
runs the local registry (mexico.science.uva.nl:8803) and two players (mexico.science.uva.nl:8804–
8805).
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In this example the generated allocation is
(3:testhp.liacs.nl:8807,28), (2:testhp.liacs.nl:8808,10), (1: mexico.science.uva.nl:8805,0),
that is item 3 is sold to player testhp.liacs.nl:8807 who pays for it to the tax collector 28,
etc.
The interaction with the system is presented in Figures 6–12 below. It consists of four
phases.
Phase 1.
This phase consists of the registration process. Selected elements of it are presented in
Figures 5–12. Figures 5 and 6 depict start of the tax collector thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8801
and the local registry thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8802 on PC1. The information board of the
latter shows that players testhp.liacs.nl:8806 and mexico.science.uva.nl:8805 registered at
this local registry.
The subsequent two Figures, 7 and 8, show successful registration of players testhp.liacs.nl:8806
and mexico.science.uva.nl:8804. Player testhp.liacs.nl:8809 was late in his attempt to reg-
ister in the local registry mexico.science.uva.nl:8803 and his registration was rejected, as
shown on Figures 9 and 10. The last figure also shows which players successfully registered
at mexico.science.uva.nl:8803.
Phases 2-4.
The second phase consists of the type submission by players whose registration has
been accepted. The third phase consists of the computation of the tax scheme by the
registered players, its multicasting to other players and (in case of budget unbalanced
mechanism) sending payments (respectively, financial claims) of the remaining taxes (re-
spectively, claims) to the tax collector. The fourth phase consists of receiving by the
registered players information from the tax collector about the aggregate tax (respec-
tively, claim) received by it.
These three phases of the running example are depicted in Figures 11 and 12 showing
the information boards of players testhp.liacs.nl:8808 and mexico.science.uva.nl:8804. In
this example, in phase 3, the tax scheme was computed by every player who subsequently
broadcast the computation result, ((testhp.liacs.nl:8807,-1,28),(testhp.liacs.nl:8808,-1,10)),
to all the players registered in the auction.
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Figure 5: Phase 1: tax collector thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8801 on PC1 (thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl).
Figure 6: Phase 1: local registry thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl:8802 on PC1 (thorbjorn.sen.cwi.nl).
Figure 7: Phase 1: player testhp.liacs.nl:8806 on PC2 (testhp.liacs.nl).
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Figure 8: Phase 1: player mexico.science.uva.nl:8804 on PC3 (mexico.science.uva.nl).
Figure 9: Phase 1: latecomer player testhp.liacs.nl:8809 on PC2 (testhp.liacs.nl).
Figure 10: Phase 1: local registry mexico.science.uva.nl:8803 with late registration on
PC3 (mexico.science.uva.nl).
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Figure 11: Phases 2-4: player testhp.liacs.nl:8808 on PC2 (testhp.liacs.nl).
Figure 12: Phases 2-4: player mexico.science.uva.nl:8804 on PC3 (mexico.science.uva.nl).
Appendix C
We discuss here in more detail the examples of Groves mechanisms implemented using
our platform by explaining how each of them can be represented as a decision problem. In
each case it is straightforward to check that the considered decision function is efficient.
Consequently in each case Groves theorem applies.
Vickrey auction We model Vickrey auction as the following decision problem (D,Θ1, . . . ,
Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f):
• D = {1, . . . , n},
• each Θi is the set R+ of non-negative reals; θi ∈ Θi is player i’s valuation of the
object,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi if d = i
0 otherwise
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• f(θ) := i,
where θi = maxj∈[1..n] θj and6 ∀j ∈ [i+ 1..n] θj < θi.
Here decision d ∈ D indicates to which player the object is sold. Below, given a
sequence s of reals we denote by [s]k the kth largest element in this sequence. For example,
for θ = (1, 5, 2, 3, 2) we have [θ−2]2 = 2 since θ−2 = (1, 2, 3, 2).
The payments (taxes) in Vickrey auction are realized by applying the VCG mechanism,
which yields
tVi (θ) :=
{ −[θ]2 if f(θ) = i
0 otherwise
Vickrey auction with redistribution To formalize the redistribution scheme of [5]
in our framework we combine each tax tVi in Vickrey auction with the following function
hi (to ensure that it is well-defined we need to assume that n ≥ 3):
hi(θ−i) :=
[θ−i]2
n
that is, by using
ti(θ) := t
V
i (θ) + hi(θ−i).
One can easily show (see [5]) that this yields a feasible Groves mechanism.
Let, given the sequence θ of submitted bids (types), pi be the permutation of 1, . . . , n
such that θpi(i) = [θ]i for i ∈ [1..n] (where we break the ties by selecting players with the
higher index first). So the ith highest bid is by player pi(i) and the object is sold to player
pi(1). Then
• [θ−i]2 = [θ]3 for i ∈ {pi(1), pi(2)},
• [θ−i]2 = [θ]2 for i ∈ {pi(3), . . . , pi(n)},
so the above Groves mechanism boils down to the following payments by player pi(1):
• [θ]3
n
to player pi(2),
• [θ]2
n
to players pi(3), . . . , pi(n),
• [θ]2 − 2n [θ]3 − n−2n [θ]2 = 2n([θ]2 − [θ]3) to the tax collector,
which is how it was originally defined in [5].
6In case of a tie we allocate the object to the player with the highest index.
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Public projects The public problem corresponds to the following decision problem:
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
• Θi = R+,
• vi(d, θi) := d(θi − cn),
• f(θ) :=
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c
0 otherwise
Here c is the cost of the project. If the project takes place, c
n
is the cost share of the
project for each player. We ensure that the decision rule is publicly known by initially
providing each player with the cost of the project c.
Unit demand auction We assume that there are n players and m items and that each
player submits a valuation for each item. The items should be allocated in such a way
that each player receives at most one of them and the aggregated valuation is maximal.
The unit demand auction with n players and m items can be modelled as the following
decision problem:
• D = {f : {1, . . . , n}→ {0, 1, . . . ,m} | ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}∃≤1i ∈ {1, . . . , n} f(i) = j},
where ∃≤1 stands for ‘there exists at most one’, i.e., each decision is a 1-1 allocation
of items to players,
• Θi = Rm+ ; (θi,1, . . . , θi,m) ∈ Θi is a vector of player i’s valuations of the items for
sale,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi,j if d(j) = i
0 if ¬∃j d(j) = i
• f(θ′) := d for which ∑j∈dom(d) θ′d(j),j is maximal.
Single-minded auction We assume that there are n players and m items and each
player i is only interested in a consecutive sequence ai, . . . , bi of the items 1, . . . ,m, with
1 ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ m.
We model this as the following decision problem:
• D = {f | f : A→ {1, . . . , n}, A ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}},
• Θi = R+; θi ∈ Θi is player i’s valuation for the sequence ai, . . . , bi of the items,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi if d(j) = i for all j ∈ [ai, . . . , bi]
0 otherwise
• f(θ′) := d for which ∑i:d([ai,...,bi])={i} θ′i is maximal,
where d([ai, . . . , bi]) = {d(j) | j ∈ [ai, . . . , bi]}.
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So, given an allocation f ∈ D the goods in the set {k | f(k) = j} are allocated to
player j. Note that alternatively f can be defined by:
f(θ′) := d for which
n∑
i=1
vi(d, θ
′
i) is maximal.
Buying a path in a network We also implemented the Groves mechanism concerned
with the problem of buying a path in a network, introduced in [13]. We consider a
communication network, modelled as a directed graph G := (V,E) (with no self-cycles or
parallel edges). We assume that each edge e ∈ E is owned by (a different) player e. We
fix two vertices s, t ∈ V and assume that for every edge e there is a s− t path in G with
the edge e removed.
Each player (owning the edge) e submits the cost θe of using e. The central authority
selects on the basis of players’ submissions the shortest s− t path in G.
This problem can be modelled as the following decision problem, where we denote the
edges by letters i, j:
• D = {p | p is a s− t path in G},
• each Θi is R+; θi is player’s i incurred cost if the edge i is used in the selected path,
• vi(p, θi) :=
{ −θi if i ∈ p
0 otherwise
• f(θ) := p, where p is the shortest s − t path in G, where the cost of each edge i is
θi.
In the case of multiple shortest paths we select, say, the one that is alphabetically
first.
One can show that the following taxes (that are payments to the players) constitute
a Groves mechanism (see [13]):
ti(θ) =
{
cost(p1)− cost(p) + θi if i ∈ p
0 otherwise
where we abbreviate
∑
j∈p θj to cost(p), p is the shortest s− t path in G selected by the
decision rule f (that is, f(θ) = p) and p1 is a shortest s − t path in G that does not
include the edge i.
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